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Abstract
The paper introduces the assumption of costly information acqui-
sition to the theory of mechanism design for matching allocation prob-
lems. It is shown that the assumption of endogenous information ac-
quisition greatly changes some of the cherished results in that theory:
in particular, the ﬁrst-best might not be implementable. Moreover,
it might not even be possible to implement the second-best through
trade. In addition, the paper highlights the use of randomness in set-
ting incentives for eﬃcient learning. The trade-oﬀs among simultane-
ous and sequential learning and among eﬃcient learning and eﬃcient
allocations are discussed.
Keywords: Serial Dictatorship, House Allocation Problems, Endoge-
nous Information. JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: C78.
∗Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10,
D-53113 Bonn, Germany.
†Thanks to Anne-Katrin Roesler for excellent research assistance. Thanks to Felix
Bierbrauer, Christoph Engel, Guillaume Haeringer, Martin Hellwig, Andreas Nicklisch,
Timoﬁy Mylovanov, Ludovic Renou, and the seminar participants at Centro de Mod-
elaci´ on Matem´ atica in Santiago de Chile, at the University of California in Berkeley, at
the University of Cologne, and at the Universidad Aut´ onoma de Barcelona for their com-
ments.
11 Introduction
The central question of allocation theory is how goods and services should
be assigned to people. The answer depends on people’s valuations for these
goods and services. If people know these valuations, the only question is
whether this information can be used in an incentive-compatible way. The
subﬁeld of allocation theory that is concerned with the design of mechanisms
that match indivisible goods to agents has been particularly successful in
that respect. For such allocation problems, there is a large class of eﬃcient
and incentive-compatible matching mechanisms. However, in many cases,
the requisite information cannot be taken as given, but must be acquired at
a cost. Whether kidneys, school slots or medical residency programmes need
to be matched to agents, it always holds that agents spend time and money
to learn about the available options before announcing their choices to the
designer. This article is concerned with the design of matching mechanisms
when the agents’ information is endogenously acquired.
Matching mechanisms specify rules according to which agent choices are
mapped to matchings of objects to agents. In the standard case of agents
knowing their own preferences, mechanisms implement social choice functions
that map proﬁles of preferences to allocations via the equilibrium behavior
of agents. When information acquisition is costly, agents face two kinds of
strategic choices. They have to decide on their information acquisition, as
well as on the actions to take in the mechanism. Just as in the case with
known preferences, mechanisms incentivize the behavior of agents for their
ex post preferences. However, in the case of costly information acquisition,
these ex post preferences are - to some extent - endogenous to the agents’
behavior, since they depend on the agents’ learning choices. Mechanisms do
set the incentives for learning choices, as the value an agent assigns to some
particular piece of information depends on the usefulness of that information
in the mechanism.
In a nutshell: in an environment of endogenous learning, mechanisms im-
plement the learning behavior of agents, as well as social choice functions
for ex post preferences. Given that these purposes potentially conﬂict not all
ex-ante Pareto optima are implementable. The trade-oﬀ between the eﬃcient
2elicitation of information and the eﬃcient usage of this information has gar-
nered interest in the nascent literature on mechanism design with endogenous
information acquisition1: Gerardi and Yariv (2008) illustrate this trade-oﬀ
by showing that welfare-optimal voting rules might not eﬃciently use all
available information, since such a voting rule not only serves to aggregate
information, but also to elicit the acquisition of this information. Berge-
mann and Valimaki (2007) discuss this same trade-oﬀ within a framework of
auctions.
I show that ﬁrst-best learning in matching allocation problems is gener-
ally sequential. This stands in contrast with the mechanisms that are used
in practice to match kidneys or school slots. These mechanisms typically re-
quire agents to submit their preferences simultaneously. This suggests that
sequential forms of these mechanisms might lead to welfare improvements.
The sequentiality of optimal information acquisition has also been featured in
the literature on mechanism design with endogenous information acquisition.
Gershkov and Szentes (2009) as well as Smorodinsky and Tennenholtz (2006)
present voting models in which the voters’ optimal acquisition of informa-
tion is sequential. Similarly, for auctions, Compte and Jehiel (2007) ﬁnd that
ascending price auctions dominate sealed bid auctions in terms of expected
welfare and, for a suﬃciently large set of bidders, in terms of expected seller
revenue.
Trade plays a major role in allocation theory: in matching allocation
problems with exogenous information, any one of the plethora of “trading
mechanisms” can be used to implement any Pareto-optimal allocation (see
for instance Papai (2000)). The result that ex-ante Pareto optima are not
always implementable with endogenous information, of course, prevents us
from obtaining such a far-reaching result for the present framework. However,
one might ask whether the second-best (namely the ex-ante Pareto optima
among the implementable set) are implementable through trade. The answer
is negative. I provide cases of matching allocation problems, in which some
mechanisms yield strictly higher ex ante welfare than the maximal ex-ante
welfare that is implementable through trade. The designer can generally
improve welfare by retaining more control over the available options than
1a review of this literature can be found in Bergemann and Valimaki (2007)
3any trading mechanism would permit.
There are some similarities and diﬀerences between the present paper and
the existing literature on endogenous information acquisition in markets (see
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Verrecchia (1982), and more recently Dang
(2008)).2 One of the main ﬁndings of that literature is that the ﬁrst-best
outcome is generally not achievable through trade in the presence of endoge-
nous information acquisition. Here I show that even the second-best might
not be implementable through trade in the context of matching problems with
endogenous information acquisition. Diﬀerent externalities generate the dif-
ferent sub-optimalities: in the literature on markets it is generally assumed
that agents can acquire information on some common value. So there is an
informational externality. Very diﬀerently in my model, the diﬀerent agents’
values of the same house are independent draws. So there is no informational
externality. A diﬀerent kind of externality is present in my model: the fact
that mechanisms need to determine matchings implies an interdependency
of the assignments to the diﬀerent agents. This, in turn, means that if some
house h∗ is oﬀered to some agent to give him the incentive to acquire a signal
on yet another house, the same house cannot be oﬀered to a diﬀerent agent
at the same time.
There is another feature of optimal matching mechanisms for housing
problems with endogenous information acquisition that I wish to highlight:
their use of randomness. On the one hand, the observation that randomness
aids implementation could count as a stylized fact of the theory of mecha-
nism design. On the other hand, there is a perfectly non-random mechanism
that can be used to implement any Pareto optimum in a matching allocation
problem with exogenous information: serial dictatorship. In a serial dicta-
2One of the basic tenets of this literature is that the equilibrium price does not per-
fectly aggregate the available information when agents can endogenously decide whether
to acquire costly information about the values of the traded assets. If prices perfectly ag-
gregated this information, no agent would have any incentive to acquire information. For
such incentives to exist, the agents who choose to obtain (costly) information must end
up better informed than those who choose not to acquire information. As a consequence,
markets with endogenous information acquisition are ineﬃcient. These results are driven
by the assumption that information concerns the common value of some asset; conversely,
the present paper concerns purely idiosyncratic values.
4torship, a ﬁrst agent (the ﬁrst dictator) gets to choose one house out of the
grand set, a next agent (the second dictator) gets to choose one house out of
the remainder. This process goes on until no houses are left. Observe that
any action an agent takes in this mechanism has a non-random outcome.
Once again, the case of matching allocation problems with endogenous
information acquisition diﬀers starkly from the standard case: I provide ex-
amples of housing problems in which the second-best cannot be implemented
through mechanisms in which each action corresponds to the deterministic
appropriation of some house. Instead, there have to be some actions with
uncertain outcomes. Randomness is a valuable tool to incentivize learning.
Moreover, randomness is useful to attenuate the clash between the objec-
tives of eﬃcient learning and eﬃcient allocations. Since randomness can be
generated via simultaneous learning, it might well be that agents need to
learn simultaneously according to the second-best mechanism - even if the
ﬁrst-best strategy always prescribes sequential learning.
I frame all these questions in a very simple environment of “house alloca-
tion problems”, in which some objects, henceforth called houses, need to be
(bijectively) matched to some agents. The model deviates as parsimoniously
as possible from the model of exogenous information inasmuch as as that
agents are able to learn the value of at most one house each. To avoid the
issue of informational externalities, the values of the houses are assumed to
be independently distributed. I assume, moreover, that agents are ex-ante
identical in the sense that they all assign the same expected values to houses
that they have not investigated. This assumption of ex-ante identity makes
it reasonable to focus on mechanisms that maximize ex-ante welfare (as op-
posed to ex-ante Pareto optimality). In the given model, the maximization
of ex-ante welfare corresponds to the maximization of expected individual
utility if each agent has an equal chance to obtain any role within the mech-
anism. Since ex-ante welfare optima are also ex-ante Pareto optima, the
results on welfare optima not being implementable directly imply that some
ex-ante Pareto optima are not implementable.
The paper is structured as follows: ﬁrst, I discuss the main concepts and
ﬁndings at the hand of an introductory example (Section 2). In Section 3, I
formally deﬁne the model and the important concepts of the paper. I go on to
5characterize ﬁrst-best behavior within the model (Section 4). In the following
Section 5, I show that some learning and allocative behavior in a matching
allocation problem is implementable, if and only if it is implementable by a
suitably deﬁned “sequential revelation mechanism”. Building on the results
from the prior two sections, Section 6 provides a suﬃcient and necessary
condition for the implementablitiy of the ﬁrst-best. In Section 7, I show
that the second-best need not be implementable through trade. Section 8 is
devoted to the trade-oﬀs between eﬃcient learning and eﬃcient allocations
and between the sequential and the simultaneous elicitation of preferences.
Section 9 concludes.
2 An Introductory Example
2.1 The Housing Problem
Consider a housing problem with three houses h1, h2 and h3 and three agents.
Assume that the agents’ true valuations of h1 and h2 are drawn from binary
distributions (p1,A1,a1) = (3
4,8,0) and (p2,A2,a2) = (1
2,3,−2) (with the
interpretation that h1 is of high value A1 = 8 with probability p1 = 3
4, and
of low value a1 = 0 otherwise, ditto for h2). These draws are independent
across houses and agents. The value of house h3 is known to be α3 = −1.
Consequently, each agent has the same a priori ranking h1 ≻ h2 ≻ h3 over the
three houses. Agents 1 and 2 can each investigate one house of their choosing.
Agent 3 evaluates h1,h2 and h3 by their expected values α1 = 6,α2 = .5 and
α3 = −1 in turn.
In terms of substance, these assumptions can be interpreted as follows.
The agents agree on an a priori ranking that depends on publicly known
aspects of the houses, such as whether a house is large or small, whether it
lies right by the highway or not, etc. A priori (before any investigations have
taken place) all agents rank the houses by their agreed expected values of
αi = piAi + (1 − pi)ai. The independence assumption implies that agents
value the initially unknown features of houses in a truly idiosyncratic manner:
the walls of a house might, for example, be painted in a shade of blue that
to some appears “fresh”; they would assign value Ai to the house, whereas
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Figure 1: Serial Dictatorship
to others the same shade would just appear “icy”.
2.2 Serial Dictatorship
To get a grasp on the eﬀects that mechanisms may have on information ac-
quisition as well as on allocations, consider serial dictatorship. In a serial
dictatorship with three houses, some agent (the ﬁrst dictator) gets to choose
a house out of the set {h1,h2,h3}, then another agent (the second dictator)
gets to pick a house out of the remainder. Figure 1 graphically represents
serial dictatorship. The tree in Figure 1 is considered a rule-tree, since it
summarizes the rules set by the mechanism designer. The nodes are labeled
with the agents, the vertices represent actions. The outcome vectors repre-
sent allocations, where the top (bottom) element represents agent 1’s (3’s)
assignment.
To comprehend the game that is being played under a given set of rules,
we also need to consider the learning decisions of agents. To this end, I
assume that, right before choosing, agents 1 and 2 may investigate any house.
The information whether and which house an agent investigates is private,
just like the outcome of that investigation. The induced game tree is large,
Figure 2 provides a partial sketch of it. Any node in this tree that is not
explicitly labeled with payoﬀs is to be considered a non-terminal node. Note
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Figure 2: Sketched Game Tree: Serial Dictatorship
that the game starts with a move of nature, in which the agents’ valuations
of the houses are determined. I only sketched the subtree following the draw
of the state ω, in which every agent values every house highly. The initial
node N of the (full) tree has a branch for every possible proﬁle of the agents’
preferences.
Any one of nature’s moves is followed by a decision node for agent 1,
in which he has to choose whether and which house to investigate (actions:
l : h1, l : h2 and ∅). All these “learning” nodes of agent 1 belong to the same
information set. Any one of these learning choices is followed by another
node for agent 1; in each of these, agent 1 can choose one out of the 3 houses.
8I chose to only sketch the subtree according to which agent 1 investigates
house h1 and chooses that same house. Once agent 1 has chosen a house, it
is up to agent 2 to decide whether and which house to investigate. Each of
these possible choices of an investigation is followed by the choice of a house
that is still available (h2 or h3 in the subtree I chose to draw).
The payoﬀs reﬂect the knowledge of agents right before they move into
their respective houses. Consider the case in which agent 2 is assigned h2.
If he did investigate h2, he obtains A2 for the given state ω; if not, he just
obtains α2. To complete the tree information-sets would have to be drawn as
well. They are such that learning is private. When agent 2 decides whether
and which house to investigate, he knows which house agent 1 has chosen; he
does, however, not know anything about agent 1’s preceding investigation.
To ﬁnd the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium, observe that there is
only one case in which h1 is not agent j’s most preferred house: agent j did
investigate h1 and found it to be of low value. In this case, agent j ranks h2 at
the top. It is therefore optimal for the ﬁrst dictator to investigate h1, to keep
it if he ﬁnds it of high value and to keep h2 otherwise. Consequently, there
are only two choice sets on the equilibrium path for the second dictator:
if the ﬁrst dictator has chosen to keep h1, the second gets to choose from
{h2,h3}, otherwise the second dictator gets to choose from {h1,h3}. In the
latter case, the second dictator will choose h1 without any investigation, since
he prefers h1 to h3, no matter whether the value of h1 is high or low (since
a1 = 0 > −1 = α3). In the ﬁrst case, it is best for the second dictator to
learn his valuation of h2 and to choose it, if and only if it is of high value
(since A2 = 3 > α3 = −1 > a2 = −2).
It is useful to separate the agents’ learning choices analytically from the
choices that matter for the allocation. This allows me to consider separately
eﬃcient allocations for given ex post preferences and eﬃcient learning. It
also facilitates the use backwards induction of determine ﬁrst-best behavior.
The learning choices are represented by learning trees, which specify
follow-up investigations for any history of outcomes of preceding investiga-
tions. In the case under discussion, the learning tree starts with agent 1’s
investigation of h1. Learning continues with agent 2’s investigation of h2,
if and only if agent 1 has found h1 to be of high value; otherwise agent 2
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Figure 3: Learning Tree, Serial Dictatorship
will not investigate any house. The choices that matter for the allocation of
the houses are summarized by an allocation function which maps any (fea-
sible) a posteriori preference proﬁles to an allocation. Figure 3 illustrates
the learning tree and allocation function implemented by serial dictatorship:
nodes correspond to investigations, branches to values, and outcomes to the
allocations prescribed for the diﬀerent a posteriori preference proﬁles.
2.3 First-Best Learning and Allocations
Serial dictatorship is but one example of a mechanism. In this subsection,
I investigate the question whether there is some learning behavior and allo-
cation functions that yield higher ex ante welfare than the learning behavior
and allocation function implemented by serial dictatorship. To determine
ﬁrst-best learning behavior and allocation functions, abstract away from any
incentive constraints. Start by ﬁxing some proﬁle of a posteriori preferences.
If possible, h1 should be assigned to someone who values it highly. If no one
values h1 highly, it should be assigned to someone who did not investigate
it. The same holds for h2. Since agent 3 cannot investigate any house, such
an allocation is always feasible.
This description of eﬃcient allocations has two immediate implications
10for ﬁrst-best learning: ﬁrstly, if an agent found some house to be of high
value, it makes no sense to let the other agent investigate the same house.
Secondly, both options to investigate a house should always be used. These
two preliminary observations leave us with just three candidates for the ﬁrst-
best learning tree. Either one agent investigates h1 and the other investigates
h2. Or one agent investigates h1 and the next agent investigates h1, if and
only if the ﬁrst found h1 to be of low value. Exchanging h1 and h2, one obtains
the third alternative. The welfare of three learning trees is O1 + O2 + B,
O1+(1−p1)O1+p1O2+B, and O2+(1−p2)O2+p2O1+B, with B: α1+α2+α3
and Oi: pi(Ai − ai) for all i. The term B can be interpreted as a base
value of welfare which arises when randomly assigning houses. Next, Oi is
called option value of hi. To gain some intuition for this statistic, consider
a hypothetical choice problem in which an agent gets to choose one of two
houses with identically and independently distributed values. The option
value of a house is the agent’s maximal willingness to pay for the right to learn
the value of one of these two houses. Intuitively, the option value summarizes
the value of learning. In this particular case, p1(A1 −α1) = 1.5 and p2(A2 −
α2) = 1.25 hold, and therefore the optimal learning tree prescribes that
agent 1 investigates house h1 and agent 2 conditions his investigation on
the outcome of that ﬁrst investigation. This observation is generalized in
Lemma 1 in Section 4, which shows that according to the ﬁrst-best learning
tree and allocation function houses should be investigated in order of their
option value.
2.4 Revelation Principle
In the standard case, without endogenous learning, the search for an opti-
mal mechanism is greatly simpliﬁed by the revelation principle, which states
that any social choice function that can be implemented by some mechanism
can also be implemented by a direct revelation mechanism. How does this
principle translate to the environment with endogenous learning? Can any
implementable learning tree and allocation function also be implemented by
a mechanism in which the designer simultaneously and truthfully elicits the
agents’ types? The preceding discussion of the ﬁrst-best learning tree imme-
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Figure 4: Rule Tree of Sequential Revelation Mechanism
diately yields a negative answer to this question. According to the ﬁrst best
learning tree, agent 2 conditions his investigation of a house on the outcome
of the ﬁrst investigation. Consequently, there exists no mechanism which,
on the one hand, implements the ﬁrst best learning tree and, on the other
hand, has simultaneous announcements of preferences. In Section 5, I show
a dynamic version of the revelation principle, according to which a learning
tree and allocation function are implementable if and only if they are imple-
mentable by a mechanism according to which the designer truthfully elicits
the agents’ types in the proper sequence. The following subsection illustrates
the principle of sequential truthful revelation.
2.5 Implementation of the First-best
The following mechanism implements the ﬁrst-best learning tree and alloca-
tion function by sequential truthful implementation: if agent 1 declares A1,
he gets h1; if not, he is wait-listed. In the ﬁrst case, agent 2 gets house h2,
if he declares A2, and h3 otherwise. In the second case, the allocation is
(h2,h1,h3) if agent 2 declares A1, and (h3,h2,h1) otherwise. The mechanism
is illustrated by the rule-tree in Figure 4.
12To see that truthful revelation is equilibrium behavior consider the de-
cision problems of the two agents. If agent 1 did announce A1, agent 2’s
announcement of A2 or a2 eﬀectively corresponds to a choice between h2 and
h3. I already observed in the discussion of serial dictatorship (Section 2.2)
that an agent who faces this choice maximizes utility by investigating h2 and
keeping it, if and only if he ﬁnds it to be of high value. Similarly, if agent 1
has announced a1, the choice of agent 2 is eﬀectively one between h1 and h2,
which implies that investigating h1 and telling the truth is a best reply for
agent 2 in this node.
Now let us consider agent 1’s decision whether to announce A1 or a1. If
he announces A1, he is being assigned h1; if he announces a1, his assignment
depends on the decision of agent 2. If agent 2 announces A1, agent 1 is
assigned h2; otherwise he is assigned h3. But we just showed that agent 2
best responds by announcing A1, if and only if he ﬁnds h1 to be of high value,
which in turn happens with a probability of 3
4. Given the choice between h1
and the lottery according to which he obtains h2 with probability 3
4 and h3
otherwise, an investigation of h1 is strictly preferable to no investigation, as
the expected value of the lottery lies strictly between the two possible values
of h1. Investigating h1 is preferable to investigating h2, since knowing the
value of h2 has no impact on the agent’s preference among h1 and h2 (h1 is
preferable to the lottery no matter whether the value of h2 is high or low).
Observe that the learning tree implemented by the mechanism is indeed
the ﬁrst-best learning tree. To see that the mechanism also implements a
ﬁrst-best allocation function, observe that any agent who claims to have
found a house to be of high value obtains that house, and no agent who
claims to have found a house to be of low value obtains this house.
Note that agent 1 faces some randomness in the sequential revelation
mechanism: If he claims that he found h1 to be of low value, his assignment
depends on the action of agent 2. In equilibrium agent 2 investigates h1
and truthfully declares the result of his investigation. Consequently, agent
1 faces some randomness on the equilibrium path. I argue in Section 7
that such randomness is actually necessary for the implementation of the ex
ante welfare optimum in the present example. Also note that the sequential
revelation mechanism is not a trading mechanism. In Section 7 I argue
13that there is no trading mechanism which would also implement the ex-ante
welfare optimum in the present example.
3 The Model
3.1 Agents, Houses, Values
There are ﬁnite sets of agents N : = {1,    ,n} and of houses H: =
{h1,    ,hn}. Agent j values house hi at ω
j
i. The goal of the designer is
to maximize welfare by matching houses to agents; formally, the objective is
to ﬁnd a bijection µ: H → N such that
 
i ω
µ(i)
i is maximized. This prob-
lem is easily solved, if all values ω
j
i are known to the designer. If this is
not the case, the question is whether the designer has any means of learning
the values ω
j
i. If this information is available to the individual agents, the
question is how he can get them to reveal it. This is the standard problem
of mechanism design. If the information is not exogenously given to the in-
dividual agents, but must be acquired by them at a cost, there is the added
issue of their incentives for information acquisition. The present paper posits
that - initially at least - neither the designer nor the agents know the values
of ω
j
i. The agents may learn some of their own valuations ω
j
i. Therefore a
mechanism sets incentives not only for the allocation of houses for given (ex
post) preferences, but also for the acquisition of information on houses.
The values of ω
j
i are assumed to be drawn from binary distributions that
are identical across agents. The draws are independent across agents and
across houses. Formally, for any agent any house hi has high value Ai with
probability pi and low value ai with the complementary probability. This
assumption of independent draws is essential to rule out informational exter-
nalities.
Agents 1 through n − 1 can learn their (idiosyncratic) value of exactly
one house each (investigate one house). There is no explicit cost of learning
in the model. An agent who opts to learn the value of some house hi only
faces the opportunity cost of not being able to investigate any other house.
14The nth agent cannot investigate any house.3
Formally, an agent’s type is identiﬁed with the vector of values he assigns
to the houses ωj = (ω
j
i)i=1,...,n. The set of all possible types of agent j is
denoted by Ωj. The underlying state space of the model is Ω = Ω1×   ×Ωn,
the space of all possible proﬁles of values ω = (ω1,     ,ωn) = (ω
j
i)i,j=1,   ,n.
The distribution of states is denoted by P, and can be constructed from the
assumptions on the distributions of the separate values ω
j
i. The space of a
posteriori preference proﬁles Ω is deﬁned as the space of all n × n matrices
ω with the feature that ω
j
i = Ai, or ω
j
i = ai for at most one i for each j < n,
and ω
j
i = αi for all other i,j. If house hi was investigated by agent j then
ω
j
i  = αi.4
3.2 Allocation Mechanisms
A mechanism Γ = (R,g) is a collection of n strategy sets
R := (R1,...,Rn) and an outcome function g : R → M that maps every
strategy proﬁle r := (r1,     ,rn) to an allocation in M. While this deﬁnition
of a mechanism is standard, the function that such a mechanism serves in
the context of the present setup diﬀers from the standard case. In the stan-
dard case, agents know their types ωj and condition their strategies on these.
In the present case, types arise endogenously out of learning choices. Said
diﬀerently: the same mechanism Γ = (R,g) induces diﬀerent games in cases
where agents know their types and the alternative cases, in which types can
be learned at a cost. In the latter case, the extensive form game induced by
Γ = (R,g) needs to be augmented by nodes that reﬂect the learning decisions
of agents.
In the case of endogenous information acquisition, a mechanism Γ =
(R,g) induces an extensive form game (T,j,D,I) where T denotes the set of
3The signiﬁcantly more complicated case, in which all n agents can investigate a house
is discussed in the Appendix (Section 10.2).
4This notion of a posteriori preferences corresponds to the moment right after the
investigations. Of course, once the agents occupy houses, they will ﬁnd out whether they
like their respective houses. If one was to study re-trading of houses, one would probably
want to detail more stages information acquisition, assuming always that an occupant of
a house would learn the value of the house he is living in.
15nodes, j and D are functions such that j(t) is the agent who gets to choose
from a action sets D(t) at node t and I describes the information sets as
follows:
The game tree starts oﬀ with a move of nature in which the state ω
is drawn from P. The remaining nodes T can be partitioned into set of
learning nodes Tl, rule nodes TR, and terminal nodes Tτ. At any learning
node t ∈ Tl, agent j(t) gets to choose whether and which house to investigate,
so D(t) = {∅,l : h1,l : h2,    ,l : hn} for t ∈ Tl, where the l : hi stands for the
choice to investigate house hi, and ∅ stands for the choice not to investigate
a house. The set of rule nodes TR is determined by the mechanism Γ. The
game is structured such that rule node t is prefaced with a learning node
for agent j(t), if j(t) has not yet investigated a house on the path leading
up to t and if j(t) < n. It is useful to go back to the sketch of the game
tree induced by serial dictatorship in Figure 2. Agent 1’s ﬁrst node after the
draw of nature is a learning node. Any learning node is succeeded by three
rule nodes tα,tβ, and tγ for agent 1 (note that due to restrictions of space I
only drew the subtree following agent 1’s choice to investigate h1). In each of
these three rule nodes, agent 1 faces the same decision (D(t) = {h1,h2,h3}
for t = tα,tβ and tγ) as prescribed by the mechanism of serial dictatorship.
Some information sets I are directly determined by Γ = (R,g): if the rules
set by the mechanism designer are such that agent 3 knows which action agent
2 chose at some preceding rule node, the information sets need to reﬂect this
knowledge. In addition, information sets I are such that learning is private,
in the sense that only an agent knows whether or which house he investigated,
and he is also the only one to know the outcome of that investigation.5
The terminal nodes specify the payoﬀs of agents, which are calculated
as follows. The decisions in the rule nodes of the path leading up to some
terminal node t ∈ Tτ determine a matching µ of houses to agents. The
payoﬀ to agent j is the a posteriori value he assigns to the house he has been
allocated. The a posteriori value that agent j assigns to house hi at some
5This assumption implies that the placement of the learning nodes directly before the
relevant rule nodes is without loss of generality. Given that agents can communicate
only through the channels given by the mechanism, there is no strategic beneﬁt to the
anticipation of learning decisions.
16terminal node t ∈ Tτ is αi, if the agent did not investigate that house on the
path leading up to t. If j did investigate his assigned house, his value is ω
j
i,
where the ﬁrst branch of the tree leading up to t is ω.
Consider the left-most terminal node in the sketch in Figure 2. The
allocation in this terminal node is determined through agents 1’s choice of
h1 and agent 2’s choice of h2 in their respective rule nodes. According to the
state of nature ω, each agent values each house highly. However, according
to the learning decisions, only agent 1 knows the value of the house he is
being assigned. So the vector of a posteriori values is (A1,α2,α3).
A strategy of agent j in the given extensive form game is denoted by sj ∈
Sj, where Sj denotes the set of his strategy proﬁles. Strategy proﬁles and sets
of strategy proﬁles are denoted by s = (s1,    ,sn) and S := (S1,    ,Sn),
respectively.
3.3 Learning Trees and Allocation Functions
For any mechanism Γ = (R,g) and the corresponding game with endogenous
information acquisition, I deﬁne two functions describing the learning and
allocations for given states and strategy proﬁles: gl : S × Ω → Ω and gF :
S × gl(S × Ω) → M. The function gl : S × Ω → Ω maps strategy proﬁles
and states to a posteriori preference proﬁles. For a house hi that has been
investigated by some agent j under some strategy proﬁle at state ω, we have
that ω
j
i = ω
j
i; for all other pairs of agents and houses, we have that ω
j
i = αi.
The function gF describes the allocation determined by the mechanism for
given a posteriori preferences ω ∈ gl(S × Ω) ⊂ Ω and given strategy proﬁles
s.6
To analyze the learning behavior and allocations implemented by mech-
anisms, I next deﬁne learning trees and allocation functions.
Deﬁnition 1 For a given housing problem, a learning tree and allocation
function (l,F) is deﬁned as follows:
A learning tree is a function l: Ω → Ω whose values are determined us-
6Since allocations can only depend on the known values, the allocation function gF
maps gl(S × Ω) ⊂ Ω instead of Ω to M.
17ing a rooted binary tree with house-agent-pairs (hi,j) as the nodes and values
Ai and ai as the edges with the following properties. The root node (hir,jr)
prescribe agent jr to start oﬀ the learning process with an investigation of
hir. From then on, learning follows (*)
(*) If the value is high and the node has an edge representing the high
value, learning continues with the house-agent-pair prescribed by that node.
and (∗) is repeated. If the node has no such edge, learning terminates. The
same holds for low values.
The tree has the property that there is no path on which the same agent
appears twice. Agent n never appears on the tree. The a posteriori proﬁle of
preferences l(ω) = ω is such that ω
j
i = ω
j
i holds for any node (hi,j) that is
visited for ω; otherwise we have ω
j
i = αi.
Any function F : l(Ω) → M is called an allocation function.
The procedural description reﬂects the fact that the choice to investigate
some house can only depend on the outcomes of prior investigations. The
assumptions that no agent can investigate two houses and that agent n can-
not investigate any house are reﬂected in the condition on the paths of the
tree. The condition that agents can only learn true values determines the
calculation of the values of l. Note that the domain of the allocation func-
tion depends on the learning tree; learning trees and allocations functions
are therefore deﬁned as pairs. House hi is assigned to agent j = F(l(ω))(hi)
at state ω, if the learning tree and allocation function are (l,F).
From now on, I restrict attention to learning trees l, according to which
agents move in the order of their index. This makes sense, since the iden-
tity of the agents who learn houses has no relevance for total welfare.7 All
uniqueness results in the sequel are understood modulo renaming of agents.
Any mechanism Γ together with a strategy proﬁle s can be associated
with a learning tree l and an allocation function F, through l(ω) = gl(s,ω)
and F(ω) = gF(s,ω). For the particular case that the strategy proﬁle under
7This is implied by the assumption that agents are a priori identical, in the sense that
their preferences are independent draws from identical distribution, together with the
assumption that each agent can investigate at most one house.
18consideration is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, we say that the associated
(l,F) are implemented by Γ.
Deﬁnition 2 The mechanism Γ implements (l,F) (via se) if the game
induced by Γ has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium strategy proﬁle se, such that
l = gl(se, ) and F = gF(se, ) on gl( ,Ω).
Note that Γ might have multiple equilibria. Therefore, one can use the same
mechanism Γ to implement diﬀerent learning trees and allocation functions.
At times, it is useful to single out the equilibrium strategy proﬁle se for which
l = gl(se, ) and F = gF(se, ) holds, in which case Γ is said to implement
(l,F) via se. Also note that a concept of equilibrium in pure strategies is
used.
The designer’s goal to choose a mechanism that maximizes welfare can
now be expressed as:
maxW(l,F)
s.t. ∃Γ : Γ implements (l,F).
where
W(l,F): =
 
ω∈Ω
P(ω)
 
n  
i=1
ω
F(l(ω))(hi)
i
 
is deﬁned as total expected welfare for the given learning tree l and allocation
function F. The ﬁrst best learning tree and allocation function (l∗,F ∗)
is deﬁned as the learning tree and allocation function that maximize social
welfare W(l,F), ignoring implementability. The second best learning
tree an allocation function (l◦,F ◦) is deﬁned as the learning tree and
allocation function that maximize social welfare, conditional on (l◦,F ◦) being
implementable.
4 The First-Best Learning Process and Allo-
cation Function
The main statistic needed to characterize the ﬁrst best learning tree and
allocation function (l∗,F ∗) is the expected increase in welfare associated with
19the investigation of a house when the designer is free to allocate that house
at its expected value or at its observed value. Formally, the option value
Oi of house hi is deﬁned as Oi: = pi(Ai − αi). I assume from now on that
there are no two houses with the same option value: Oi  = Oi′ for all i  = i′. 8
I assume, in addition, that houses are indexed in terms of their option value
such that Oi > Oi+1 for all i.
Lemma 1 Any ﬁrst-best learning tree and allocation function (l∗,F ∗) can be
described as follows:
• after any history of investigations, l∗ prescribes to investigate a house
with maximal option value among all houses which have not yet been
found to be of high value in some prior investigation. This process
continues until agent n − 1.
• F ∗ : l∗(Ω) → M matches hi with agent j, if agent j found house hi to
be of high value. All other houses are assigned to agents who evaluate
them at their expected values.
According to l∗, agents should investigate h1 as long as no one has found
it of high value. Once this happens they should move on to the h2 and so
forth. Observe that F ∗ is well-deﬁned, since for any ω ∈ l∗(Ω) at most one
agent knows a particular house to be of high value. If we drop the assumption
that no two houses have the same option value, there are as many optimal
learning trees as there are ways to order the houses according to their option
value.9 The set of eﬃcient allocation functions is large, since there are many
diﬀerent ways to assign houses to agents who did not investigate them.
Here I just discuss some of the main features of the proof, which can be
found in the Appendix. In the proof, I deﬁne a set of learning processes
and allocation functions (  l,   F) that prescribe continuation strategies for
8This assumption is not without loss of generality. However, while the results only
change slightly, the notation becomes signiﬁcantly less cumbersome. Throughout the
text, I will point out how the results need to be amended to account for the case that
Oi  = Oi′ holds for some i  = i′.
9This presumes, of course, that agents move in order of their index, as discussed at the
end of Section 3.
20all histories of investigations. The upshot is that backward induction can
be used to characterize the welfare-optimal learning process and allocation
function (  l∗,   F ∗).
I start by showing that   F ∗(ω) =
 
i∈N ω
µ(i)
i with µ(i) =   F ∗(ω)(hi) maxi-
mizes welfare if each house hi is matched to an agent µ(i) who assigns value
maxj{ω
j
i} to this house - conditioning on ω being the proﬁle of a posteriori
preferences.
To prove the optimality of   l∗ by backwards induction, consider the n−1st
learner. Observe that the assumption that the n’th agent cannot investigate
any house and therefore evaluates all houses at their expected value implies
that no matter which house the n − 1st agent investigates the designer is
free to allocate each house either at its expected value or to some agent who
investigated it.10 Therefore, the n − 1st agent should learn the house with
the highest option value that has not yet been found to be of high value by
any agent. The inductive step follows from similar arguments.
5 Sequential Revelation Mechansims
The original version of the revelation principle as formulated by Myerson
(1982, 1985) does not apply to games of endogenous sequential learning.11 I
therefore start this section with the statement of a version of the revelation
principle that applies to the present case of sequential learning. To this end,
I deﬁne a mechanism as a sequential revelation mechanism if each agent
has at most one rule node on any path of the corresponding game tree, if
each rule node has two edges and if these edges correspond to the messages
“Ai” and “ai”. Formally, we have that D(t) = {Ai(t),ai(t)} for some house
i(t) for any t ∈ TR, where the set D(t) is to be interpreted as the set of
10The assumption that only n − 1 agents can investigate a house is essential for this
argument. This problem renders the extension to the case of n learners non-trivial. Since
the terminology developed in the proof Lemma 1 turns out to be useful in the discussion
of the n-learner case, this discussion is relegated to the Appendix (Section 10.2).
11To see this, consider the welfare-optimal mechanism as deﬁned in the introductory
example (Section 2.5). There is no normal form game in which agents 1 and 2 simultane-
ously announce their types to the designer, while at the same time agent 2 conditions his
learning about his own type on his knowledge of the type of agent 1.
21possible messages that can be sent to the mechanism designer. A strategy
proﬁle in the corresponding game with endogenous information acquisition
st is considered truthful if the following two conditions hold: ﬁrstly, in any
learning node t ∈ Tl, agent j(t) investigates house hi, if the choices in the
succeeding rule nodes t′ are D(t′) = {Ai,ai}. Secondly, an agent who has
investigated the house prescribed by st announces Ai if and only if he found
hi to be of high value.
Observe that in the context of endogenous learning truthfulness not only
requires that agents report their types. Agents are, in addition, required to
obtain the information that they are supposed to report truthfully. If an
agent investigates some house hi′ before a rule node t with D(t) = {Ai,ai},
he cannot possibly report his type truthfully. In that case, he evaluates hi
at αi / ∈ {Ai,ai}.12
A sequential revelation mechanism Γ = (R,g) truthfully implements a
learning tree and allocation function (l,F) if the truthful strategy proﬁle st
is an equilibrium in the induced game and if gl( ,st) = l and gF( ,st) = F.
Example 1 Reconsidering the housing problem deﬁned in Section 2, observe
that serial dictatorship is not an sequential revelation mechanism, as the
ﬁrst dictator can choose from three houses. However, the learning tree and
allocation function (l,F) that are implemented by serial dictatorship can
be implemented by the following sequential revelation mechanism: ﬁrst, the
mechanism designer asks the ﬁrst agent whether he values h1 highly or not.
If the ﬁrst agent has claimed to value h1 highly, the designer asks the second
agent for his valuation of h2. Allocations are such that agent 1 is assigned
h1 if he claims to value it highly. In that case, house h2 is assigned to agent
2, if and only if he claims to value it highly; otherwise he is assigned h3. If
agent 1 claims a1, agents 1,2 and 3 are allocated h2,h1, and h3 in that order.
Another example of a sequential revelation mechanism was already discussed
12Of course, sequential revelation mechanisms could also have been deﬁned using larger
sets of announcements D(t) = {A1,a1,A2,a2,    ,An,an}. In such mechanisms agents
can truthfully report their type after any learning decision. The upshot of “tailoring”
sequential revelation mechanism for particular learning trees is that smaller strategy sets
facilitate implementation: with larger strategy sets, more deviations need to be considered
to establish that a particular strategy proﬁle is an equilibrium.
22in Section 2.5.
The example is generalized in the next theorem on sequential revelation
mechanisms.
Theorem 1 A learning tree and allocation function (l,F) are implementable
by some mechanism Γ, if and only if they are truthfully implementable by
some sequential revelation mechanism Γ′.
Proof Let (l,F) be implemented by Γ via se. Prune the game tree, so
that all edges that correspond to actions never chosen according to se are
deleted. Next, drop all remaining rule nodes with only one edge and observe
that the surviving rule nodes have the feature that the action chosen in these
nodes depends on the investigation of a house. Consequently, there is at
most one rule node remaining per path and player. All these rule nodes have
exactly two branches, since the state variable on which the choice is based
is binary and since only pure strategies are considered. The suitably pruned
strategy proﬁle se
p is also an equilibrium in the pruned tree and corresponding
mechanism Γ′ and implements (l,F). Now construct a mechanism Γ′′ that
has the same set of nodes T as Γ′. Construct Γ′′ through a relabeling of the
actions in Γ′ such that for any rule node t ∈ TR at which se
p prescribes that
j(t) learn hi before t let D′′(t) = {Ai,ai} with the interpretation that D′′(t)
is the set of possible messages to the designer at node t in mechanism Γ′′.
The designer reveals information in Γ′′ according to the information sets in
Γ′ and determines outcomes in Γ′′ as if the agents had played according to
se
p in the game induced by Γ′. Observe that (l,F) is implemented in Γ′′ via
the strategy proﬁle that corresponds to se
p. The reverse conclusion is trivial,
since sequential revelation mechanisms are mechanisms, too. ￿
Theorem 1 can easily be extended to distributions with more than two
values: the number of available messages simply needs to be adjusted to the
number of relevant states. Furthermore, the assumption that values of all
houses are distributed independently and identically across agents did not
enter the proof. Similarly, the theorem can be amended to multiple learning
23decisions. The main diﬀerence with respect to the standard revelation prin-
ciple is that in the present case, it is not possible to elicit the agents’ types
simultaneously. In the present case, types are endogenous and some agents
might condition their learning on the actions of others. Consequently, some
agents might have to wait for the revelation of some other agents’ types to
base their endogenous learning decision on this information. Furthermore,
the designer not only has to provide proper incentives to reveal the truth but
he also has to provide the incentive to learn according to his desired learning
tree.
6 Implementation of the First-Best
Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 lead up to Corollary 1 on the set of cases in which
the ﬁrst best is implementable. To understand the problems associated with
the implementation of the ﬁrst-best learning tree and allocation function,
consider a sequential revelation mechanism Γ that implements (l∗,F ∗). The
learning tree l∗ prescribes the order in which agents are supposed to learn
houses. Since Γ is a sequential revelation mechanism, the choice oﬀered to
agent j at a node where he is supposed to investigate house hi must be
a choice between declaring Ai or ai. Next, F ∗ prescribes that the agent
obtains hi if he (truthfully) declares Ai. The fall-back option, that is, the
lottery over houses that declaring ai corresponds to, must satisfy the following
(potentially conﬂicting) three conditions. The probability that the agent
obtains hi if he announces ai, must ﬁrst of all, be zero; otherwise F ∗ would
be violated. Secondly, for truth-telling to be equilibrium behavior, agent j
must ﬁnd it in his best interest to investigate hi and to report the true value
when given the choice between obtaining hi and the fall-back option. Thirdly,
the fall-back options must be consistent in the sense that the mechanism
terminates with allocations.
From this discussion it can already be gleaned that the designer’s ability
to design fall-back options is of essence for the implementation of the ﬁrst-
best. To grasp the requirement better that an agent should ﬁnd it in his
best interest to investigate hi when l∗ prescribes for him to investigate hi,
some more deﬁnitions are needed. Lotteries on houses are deﬁned as π :=
24(π1,...,πn), where πi stands for the probability that the agent obtains hi.
Degenerate lotteries π with πi = 1 for some i are denoted by hi. The expected
value of the lottery π is denoted by E(π).
Deﬁnition 3 A lottery π is said to incentivize (the learning of) hi if given
the choice between hi and π, the investigation of hi is strictly preferable to no
investigation and weakly preferable to the investigation of any other house.
If π incentivizes hi, I write hi %l π.13
Observe that statements such as π′ %l hi or π′ % π are left undeﬁned for
non-degenerate lotteries π′. For any h1 = (p1,A1,a1) and h2 = (p2,A2,a2)
the requirement of h1 %l h2 amounts to the following inequalities:
A1 > α2 > a1
p1A1 + (1 − p1)α2 ≥ p2A2 + (1 − p2)α1
The ﬁrst inequality ensures that learning h1 is strictly preferred to choosing
without learning. The second inequality formalizes the requirement that
learning h1 is weakly preferred to learning h2. If an agent is given the option
to choose a house from a set {h1,h2} with h1 %l h2 it is optimal for him to
investigate h1 and to choose it, if and only if it has high value for him.
The relation between the learning order %l and the order by option values
describes the crux of the present design problem. If the two coincide the prob-
lem of the designer is straightforward, and agents are happy to investigate
houses in the order prescribed by the ﬁrst-best learning tree. The problem lies
in the fact that these two relations do not generally coincide. It is convenient
to introduce further notation for sequential revelation mechanisms. Let dA(t)
be the number of high value statements in the history leading up to t. Deﬁne
a function i : TR → {1,    ,n} such that at node t the designer asks agent j(t)
for the value of house hi(t). For any strategy proﬁle s, any rule-node t ∈ TR
and the two possible announcements X ∈ {Ai(t),ai(t)} at t, let πi(t,s,X) be
deﬁned as the probability with which agent j(t) obtains hi, given that he
13This is equivalent to demanding that the investigation of hi be strictly preferable to
no investigation and weakly preferable to the investigation of any house in the support of
π, as investigating a house not in the support of π corresponds to not investigating any
house.
25makes announcement X at node t, and given that all other agents follow the
strategy proﬁle s. Let πi(t,s,X) = (π1(t,s,X),    ,πn(t,s,X)) stand for the
corresponding lottery over houses.
Corollary 1 The ﬁrst-best (l∗,F ∗) is implementable, if and only if there
exists a sequential revelation mechanism Γ, such that the following holds for
all rule-nodes t ∈ TR:
• i(t) = dA(t) + 1.
• π(t,st,Ai(t)) = hi(t) and πi(t,st,ai(t)) = 0.
• hi(t) %l π(t,st,ai(t)).14
Proof By Theorem 1, (l∗,F ∗) can be implemented, if and only if it can
be implemented truthfully through a sequential revelation mechanism. Let
Γ = (R,g) be the sequential revelation mechanism that truthfully implements
(l∗,F ∗). Observe that l∗ = gl( ,st) holds, if and only if the ﬁrst requirement
above holds. Next, observe that conditional on the ﬁrst observation, F ∗ =
gF( ,st) holds, if and only if the second requirement holds. Finally st is a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium, if and only if the last requirement holds, since
π(t,st,Ai(t)) = hi(t) holds for all nodes t. 15 ￿
Observe that Corollary 1 can be split into a “mechanical” and an “artful”
part. The ﬁrst two conditions straightforwardly determine some properties
of any sequential revelation mechanism that might implement (l∗,F ∗): the
designer has to oﬀer the houses that should be learned according to l∗ in the
sequence prescribed by l∗. The art of mechanism design stands out when
considering the third requirement, which demands that there is a way to use
the houses that are not found to be of high value as fall-back options to
incentivize learning according to l∗. The following example deﬁnes a housing
problem in which the ﬁrst best cannot be implemented.
14If some houses have the same option value, the statement has to hold for some index-
ation of the set of houses with Oi ≥ Oi+1 for all i.
15Note that all nodes are reached with positive probability; therefore, we need not be
concerned with out of equilibrium beliefs. If I had deﬁned sequential revelation mechanisms
with message spaces large enough to allow for the announcement of any possible a posteriori
type, as suggested in footnote 12, this would not hold.
26Example 2 Deﬁne a housing problem with three agents through
h1 = (p1,A1,a1) = (1
2,70,−10), h2 = (p2,A2,a2) = (3
4,100,0), and h3 =
α3 = −2. Observe that α1 = 30, α2 = 75, O1 = 20, and O2 = 75
4 , which
implies that houses are indexed by their option values. To see that the ﬁrst-
best is not implementable, suppose it was. Let Γ = (R,g) be the sequential
revelation mechanism that implements it according to Theorem 1. Since h1
has the highest option value, the ﬁrst agent needs to be given the choice to
announce either A1 or a1. Let us have a look at the node after a declaration
of A1 by the ﬁrst agent. We must have that π(A1,st,A2) = h2, since agent 2
has to be allowed to keep h2, if he would like to do so. On the other hand,
we must have π(A1,st,a2) = h3, as h3 is the only other remaining house.
However, agent 2 is not willing to investigate h2 in this node, as h2 %l h3
does not hold (since a2 > α3).
What is important to note is that the ineﬃciency of the example is not one
of asymmetric information. To see this ﬁx any knowledge structure consistent
with the example, meaning assume that agents 1 and 2 each privately know
the value of one house. For each of these 3 cases (either both know the value of
h1, or both know the value for h2, or each knows the value of a diﬀerent house)
one can design mechanisms that implements a welfare maximal allocation.
With endogenous learning, though, it is not possible to design a mechanism
that achieves the ﬁrst best ex ante welfare. The diﬀerence between the ex
ante optimal welfare and the welfare due to random assignment is p1O1 +
p1(1 − p1)O1 + (1 − p1)O2, I show in Section 8 that the diﬀerence between
the highest implementable ex ante welfare and the welfare associated with
random assignments is just p1O1 + p2O2.
7 Trading Mechanisms
Can all welfare optima of housing problems with endogenous information
acquisition be reached via markets? The second welfare theorem tells us that
in an environment with divisible goods, convex and non-satiated preferences
(and without endogenous information acquisition), any Pareto optimum can
be sustained as a market equilibrium with transfers. Similarly, for the case of
27housing problems (without endogenous information acquisition), any Pareto
optimum can be reached via the choice of some appropriate initial allocation
and free trade among agents (see, for instance, Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez
(1998)). Here I will show that endogenous information acquisition breaks
this result. In fact, I show that not even the second best learning tree and
allocation function needs (l◦,F ◦) to be implementable through free trade.16
In this section, I identify “free trade” for the given environment with
Gale’s top trading cycles mechanism as deﬁned by Shapley and Scarf (1974).
In this mechanism, each agent initially owns one house. In a ﬁrst round,
all agents are invited to point to the owners of their most preferred houses.
Since there are only ﬁnitely many agents, at least one cycle forms. All agents
in these cycles are assigned the houses that they are pointing to. The same
procedure is repeated until all agents have been assigned a house. This
mechanism can be considered a “free-trade”mechanism, since property rights
for all houses are assigned to agents and since all exchanges are voluntary
(agents may always point to their own house and form a cycle of length one).
Theorem 2 The second-best learning tree and allocation function (l◦,F ◦)
might not be implementable through Gale’s top trading cycles mechanism.
Proof Reconsider the introductory example. I already showed in Section
2.5 that there exists a mechanism that does implement the ﬁrst-best (l∗,F ∗).
Next, I show that this is the unique sequential revelation mechanism that
implements (l∗,F ∗). To see this, consider a sequential revelation mechanism
that does implement (l∗,F ∗) and observe that the designer has very little
leeway in designing F ∗. For the any a posteriori preferences proﬁle ω with
ω1
1 = A1, agent 1 must be assigned h1. The welfare-optimal allocations are
then uniquely determined by the outcome of agent 2’s investigation of h2.
If he ﬁnds h2 of high value, then h2 and agent 2 must be matched; if not,
h3 must be allocated to agent 2. On the other hand, following agent 1’s
observation that he values house h1 at a1, agent 2 must investigate h1 to
follow l∗. To have an incentive to do so and to be in line with a welfare-
16Example 2 entails that we do not even need to bother with the implementation of the
ﬁrst best through trade, as it was shown that no mechanisms whatsoever implements the
ﬁrst best in that example.
28optimal allocation, agent 2 must be given a choice between h1 and h2. This
implies that the allocation must be such that agent 1 obtains h3 and agent 2
obtains h2 after both agent 1 and 2 found h1 to be of low value. Finally, to
give agent 1 an incentive to investigate h1, the fall-back option π he receives
when announcing a1 must be such that h1 %l π. This implies that the
allocation for the a posteriori preference proﬁle, according to which agent
1 found h1 to be of low value, while agent 2 found the same house of high
value, must be such that agent 1 obtains h2 and agent 2 obtains h1. This
completes the proof that the mechanism described in Section 2.5 is the unique
sequential revelation mechanism that implements (l∗,F ∗).
Now suppose that there was an initial assignment of houses such that
Gale’s top trading cycles mechanism implemented (l∗,F ∗). By the above
arguments, the equivalent sequential revelation mechanism must be the one
described in Section 2.5. But we know that each agent has a positive chance
to be assigned h3 according this mechanism. But this stands in conﬂict with
the observation that there are no a posteriori preferences, under which the
initial owner of h1 would be willing to trade that house for h3. We can
conclude that in the introductory housing problem the second-best (l◦,F ◦)
(which is equal to the ﬁrst-best (l∗,F ∗)) cannot be implemented through
Gale’s top trading cycles mechanism. ￿
One might criticize Gale’s top trading cycles mechanism as too limited
a notion of “free trade”. Gale’s mechanism does, for example, rule out that
some agents start out by owning multiple houses. The class of hierarchical
exchange mechanism as deﬁned by Papai (2000) is not vulnerable to this
criticism. It turns out that Theorem 2 also holds true for this much larger
class of mechanisms. Since the deﬁnition of hierarchical exchange mecha-
nism is cumbersome I restrict myself to a rather informal discussion of this
result here. A mechanism is a hierarchical exchange mechanism if all
houses are initially owned by some agents and if the ﬁnal allocation is deter-
mined through inheritance rules and voluntary trading. Initially some agents
might own more than one house; others might not own any houses. Most
importantly, though, each house starts out being owned by someone. The
mechanism requires that each agent points to some house and houses point
to their owners. Due to the ﬁniteness of the problem, there is at least one
29group of agents and equally many houses that form a cycle. All agents and
houses in that cycle are assigned the house that they point to. If an owner
of several houses takes part in such an exchange ring, one of his houses will
be assigned through the cycle. All other houses are passed on to agents who
have not yet been assigned a house according to some ﬁxed inheritance rule.
Then the procedure restarts with the remaining agents pointing to the re-
maining houses. The ﬁniteness of the problem implies that all houses will be
assigned through this procedure.
Serial dictatorship and Gale’s top trading cycles are both examples of hi-
erarchical exchange mechanisms. According to serial dictatorship, all houses
are initially owned by the ﬁrst dictator. The inheritance rule prescribes that
all houses that he does not choose (by forming a cycle of length one, by point-
ing to one of his houses) are inherited by the second dictator and so forth.
In Gale’s top trading cycles, each agent initially owns one house, inheritance
rules are consequently irrelevant.
Now to see that Theorem 2 cannot be ﬁxed using the larger class of hierar-
chical exchange mechanisms, meaning that also the much stronger statement
that the second-best learning tree and allocation function (l◦,F ◦) might not
be implementable through any hierarchical exchange mechanism, reconsider
the proof of Theorem 2. Observe that this proof revolved around the obser-
vation that the following three ingredients are incompatible: 1. according to
the unique ﬁrst best learning tree and allocation function, any agent has a
positive chance to obtain h3 as his assignment. 2. Some agent owns h1 in
the initial period of the mechanism. 3. There are no ex-post preferences ac-
cording to which the owner of h1 would voluntarily accept being assigned h3.
The same incompatibility applies to any hierarchical exchange mechanism.
This extension of Theorem 2 makes it hard to think of a version of the
second welfare theorem that would hold for housing problems with endoge-
nous information acquisition. In the case of known types, all Pareto optima
can be reached through market mechanisms given suitable endowments: in
this case, control of the designer can at most be a hindrance to achieving
Pareto optima. Conversely, in the case of endogenous information acquisi-
tion, there are reasons to limit trading: such limits might be instrumental in
the provision of the proper incentives for learning.
308 Trade-Oﬀs: Simultaneous versus Sequen-
tial Learning; Eﬃcient Learning versus Ef-
ﬁcient Allocations
In this section, I show that the second-best learning tree and allocation func-
tion (l◦,F ◦) might only be implementable through a mechanism in which
agents acquire information simultaneously. Up to now, one might get the
impression that sequential learning is always a boon for the designer: as long
as all option values of the houses are diﬀerent, the ﬁrst-best learning tree
prescribes that the choice of the house to be investigated next should always
be conditioned on the outcomes of prior investigations. But this is just a
feature of the ﬁrst-best learning tree. I get back to Example 2 to show that
for some housing problems it is strictly preferable to use a mechanism in
which agents cannot condition their choice to learn a house on the outcomes
of other investigations. Such simultaneity might be optimal, since it provides
the mechanism designer with a source of randomness, which is, in turn, an
important instrument to get agents to learn.
The same example can be used to illustrate the trade-oﬀ between eﬃ-
cient learning and eﬃcient allocations, if the ﬁrst-best (l∗,F ∗) is not imple-
mentable. The search for the second-best (l◦,F ◦) can be structured as, ﬁrst,
the calculation of a frontier in which more eﬃcient learning trees are imple-
mented together with less eﬃcient allocation functions. Then welfare for all
(l,F) on the frontier can be calculated to determine the second-best (l◦,F ◦).
Example 3 Reconsider Example 2. Deﬁne a sequential revelation mech-
anism Γ′ = (R′,g′) through the rule-tree given in Figure 5. I show that
the mechanism Γ′ implements the ﬁrst-best learning tree l∗ and achieves the
highest welfare among all mechanisms that do so, formally, Γ′ implements
(l∗,F ′) such that W(l∗,F ′) ≥ W(l∗,F ′′) for all implementable (l∗,F ′′).
Consider the truthful strategy proﬁle st and observe that gl( ,st) = l∗.
To see that st is an equilibrium in Γ′, observe that, after the history A1,
agent 2 can choose between h2 and h1. Since h2 %l h1, it is in agent 2’s
best interest to learn the value of h2 and to reveal it truthfully. On the
other hand, after history a1 agent 2 faces a choice between h1 and h3. Since
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Figure 5: Rule-Tree for Γ′
h1 %l h3, the truthful strategy proﬁle prescribes a best reply at this node.
To analyze agent 1’s decision, observe that the announcements of A1 and a1
correspond to the following lotteries over houses: π(∅,st,A1) = (3
4, 1
4,0) and
π(∅,st,a1) = (0, 1
2, 1
2). The diﬀerence between the utility of investigating h1
and h2 can be expressed as follows:
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> 0.
This implies, in turn, that learning h1 and truthfully revealing its value is a
best reply for agent 1.
It only remains to be shown that there exists no other mechanism Γ′′
that implements some (l∗,F ′′) such that W(l∗,F ′′) > W(l∗,F ′). To see this,
observe that to get agent 2 to investigate h2 he has to be oﬀered a choice
between h1 and h2 (his choice has to be over deterministic outcomes, since
he is the last one to investigate any houses). This implies that agent 1 can
receive h1 at most with a probability of
3
4 if he ﬁnds it of high value. Next,
observe that the necessary ineﬃciency just described is the only ineﬃciency
in F ′. Therefore W(l∗,F ′) ≥ W(l∗,F ′′) holds for any implementable (l∗,F ′′).
32Now, of course, the second-best (l◦,F ◦) need not have the feature that
l◦ = l∗. The next mechanism Γ = (R,g) implements a less eﬃcient learning
tree together with an eﬃcient allocation function. Let R
j
= {hj, no thanks}
for j = 1,2 and let allocations be determined by the following matrix. The
h2 no thanks
h1 (h1,h2,h3) (h1,h3,h2)
no thanks (h3,h2,h1) (h3,h1,h2)
action “hj” can be interpreted as a choice of hj, whereas the strategy “no
thanks” can be interpreted as declining hj. The mechanism has an equilib-
rium se which is such that agent j investigates hj and keeps it, if and only
if he found it of high value. To see that se is an equilibrium, observe that
agent 1’s choice amounts to a choice among h1 and h3. For agent 1’s ﬁxed
strategy se
1, agent 2 chooses from {h2,
 
1
2,0, 1
2
 
}, where h2 %l
 
1
2,0, 1
2
 
holds
as α2 >
1
270 +
1
2(−2) and A2 > E
 
1
2,0,
1
2
 
> a2.17
The learning tree l = gl( ,se) is such that agent j unconditionally inves-
tigates house hj for j = 1,2, and therefore ω ∈ l(Ω), if and only if ωi
i  = αi
for i = 1,2. The allocation function gF( ,se) = F implemented by Γ is
such that any house that was found to be of high value by some agent is
assigned at high value and all other houses are assigned at their expected
values. Therefore, F is an eﬃcient allocation function.
To ﬁnd the second-best (l◦,F ◦) we do not need to look any further: we
already found that F ′ is the allocation function that maximizes W(l∗,F)
subject to (l∗,F) being implementable. Next, observe that l diﬀers from l∗
only insofar as that l∗ prescribes that h1 is investigated after h1 was found
of low value, whereas l prescribes that h2 is investigated in that same case.
This is smallest possible deviation from l∗. Given that this learning tree
l is implementable together with an eﬃcient allocation function F, there
cannot possibly be another implementable pair (  l,   F) such that W(  l,   F) >
max(W(l∗,F ′),W(l,F)).
17Observe that this is the only strategy proﬁle that survives the iterated elimination of
dominated strategies.
33So we are facing a trade-oﬀ between eﬃcient allocations and eﬃcient
learning here. We can either implement the eﬃcient learning tree together
with a less than eﬃcient allocation function, or we can implement a less than
eﬃcient learning tree together with an eﬃcient allocation function. In this
particular case, the latter is preferable: the diﬀerence between W(l∗,F ′) and
W(l,F) can be expressed as the diﬀerence between
p1p2(A1 − α1) + p1p2(A2 − α2) + (1 − p1)p1(A1 − α1) + (α1 + α2 + α3)
and p1(A1 − α1) + p2(A2 − α2) + (α1 + α2 + α3) which comes down to
O1(p2 − p1) − O2(1 − p1) = 20(3
4 − 1
2) − 75
4 (1 − 1
2) < 0.
An important observation to carry away is that h1 and h2 are being
investigated simultaneously according to the second-best (l◦,F ◦). So while
the ﬁrst-best always requires that agents learn sequentially, such sequentiality
might not be desirable to implement the second-best. In the present case,
h3 is unattractive in any which way: its expected value is so low as to make
it hard to use it to incentivize learning; moreover, its option value is zero.
Therefore, to incentivize learning of both h1 or h2, agents need to believe
that the probability that they will end up with h3 is low. When learning is
sequential, such belief cannot be generated.
In general there are two reasons why such randomness facilitates incen-
tivization. First of all, the attractiveness to investigate a house increases
with the probability that the agent would obtain this house if he found it if
high value. Consider an environment in which each house attains its high
value with probability
1
2 and in which house h1’s high and low value are
100 and 0 whereas house h2 and h3’s high and low value are 110 and −10
each. Observe that it is optimal to learn the value of h2 for an agent who
has the choice between h1 and h2. Conversely, for an agent who can choose
between h1 and an equal lottery on h2 and h3 it is optimal to learn the value
of h1. To understand the second reason, observe that a necessary condition
for hi % hi′ to hold is that Ai > αi′ > ai. So if we have three houses h1,h2
and h3 with α2 < a1 and α3 > A1 neither h2 nor h3 incentivize the learning
of h1. However, h1 %l π can hold for a lottery π over h2 and h3 such that
a1 < E(π) < A1. These two eﬀects of randomization are summarized in
the more general statement that the relation %l is convex, in the sense that
34h %l π together with h %l π′ implies that h %l ρπ + (1 − ρ)π′.18
Also note that the calculation of the second-best (l◦,F ◦) was broken down
into the following two steps: I ﬁrst calculated a frontier of learning trees and
allocation functions that combined more eﬃcient learning trees with less ef-
ﬁcient allocation functions. I then compared the welfare achieved by the
diﬀerent pairs (l,F) on that frontier. Note that an application of this pro-
cedure to other problems requires a deﬁnition of the degree of eﬃciency of a
learning tree. In the present case, this was not necessary as the learning tree
l is “obviously” the second-most eﬃcient learning tree in the given example
and as this second-most eﬃcient learning tree is already implementable to-
gether with an eﬃcient allocation function. In general, the notion of a more
eﬃcient learning tree could be operationalized as l is more eﬃcient than l′ if
W(l,F) > W(l′,F ′) for F and F ′ eﬃcient allocation functions.
9 Conclusion
The present paper points out some major diﬀerences between mechanism de-
sign for housing problems with and without endogenous information acqui-
sition. In the standard case, in which agents know their types, any desired
Pareto optimum in a housing problem can be achieved through a trading
18To see this, consider a house h = (p,A,a) and two lotteries π,π′ with h %l π
and h %l π′. Since A > EU(π) > a as well as A > EU(π′) > a, it follows that
A > EU(ρπ + (1 − ρ)π′) > a for all ρ ∈ (0,1). Moreover,
pA + (1 − p)EU(π) ≥ pi0(πi0Ai0 +
 
i =i0
πiαi) + (1 − pi0)α and
pA + (1 − p)EU(π′) ≥ p′
i0(π′
i0Ai0 +
 
i =i0
π′
iαi) + (1 − p′
i0)α
∀i0 ∈ {1,...,n}
Hence, for any convex combination ˜ π = ρπ + (1 − ρ)π′,ρ ∈ (0,1) the following holds:
pA + (1 − p)EU(˜ π) ≥ ˜ pi0(˜ πi0Ai0 +
 
i =i0
˜ piαi) + (1 − ˜ πi0)α
∀i0 ∈ {1,...,n}.
Which shows that %l is convex.
35mechanism. In contrast, I showed that in the case in which agents need to
acquire information on their types, not such trading mechanisms need not
even implement the second best learning tree and allocation function. In the
case of endogenous information acquisition, a strong-handed mechanism de-
signer might be best. Free trade might simply not pose the correct incentives
for information acquisition.
I showed that ﬁrst-best learning tree is such that agents investigate houses
in sequence of their option values (Lemma 1). I complemented this result on
the optimality of sequential learning with an example in which the second-
best can only be achieved through simultaneous learning (Section 8). Such
examples can exist, since simultaneous learning increases the scope of ran-
domness, which is, in turn, a powerful instrument to incentivize learning, as
I argued in Section 7.
To derive a characterization of all housing problems in which the ﬁrst-best
is implementable I developed a dynamic version of the revelation principle:
I showed that some learning tree and allocation function are implementable
if and only if they are truthfully implementable by a mechanism in which
the designer asks agents for their types in the sequences mandated by the
learning tree to be implemented (Section 5).
It is hoped that further development of the theory would come up with
mechanisms that are robust to changes in the designer’s and the agent’s be-
liefs about the distribution of values and the learning technology. Of course,
starting with the results developed in the present paper, we already know
that there are no mechanisms that are ex ante welfare-optimal for any such
speciﬁcation. We might, however, be able to characterize a set of mechanisms
that yield ex ante Pareto optima for some large set of assumptions on the
distribution of values and the learning technology.
10 Appendix
10.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 in Section 4 characterizes the ﬁrst-best learning tree and allocation
function (l∗,F ∗). The present subsection gives a detailed proof via backwards
36induction. To be fully general I drop the assumption that no two houses share
the same option value, which implies that there might be multiple indexations
by option value.
Some more notation is needed to deﬁne an object to which backwards
induction can be applied. A sequence of values   ω = (ω1
i1,ω2
i2,    ,ωk
ik) for
1 ≤ k < n is called a learning history, with the additional assumption
that ∅ denotes the initial history before any investigations.19 Observe that
the set of all learning histories   Ω is naturally embedded in the set of all
a posteriori preference proﬁles Ω, by identifying the learning history   ω =
(ω1
i1,ω2
i2,    ,ωk
ik) with the proﬁle of a posteriori preferences ω according to
which ωl
il = ωl
il holds for all 1 ≤ l ≤ k, additionally the learning history
∅ is identiﬁed with the a priori proﬁle of preference. The index k is called
the length of learning history   ω = (ω1
i1,ω2
i2,    ,ωk
ik). A learning history
  ω′ is called a continuation of some learning history   ω of length k if   ω′ =
(  ω,ω
k+1
ik+1,    ,ωl
il) for some k < l < n.
A learning subtree ls is a subtree of a learning tree l. The set of
all learning subtrees which, of course, contains the set of learning trees, is
denoted by L. A learning process is a function that maps learning histories
to (feasible and consistent) continuations of learning. Formally, we have that
  l is a function   l :   Ω → L with the following two properties. The function is
feasible meaning that   l(  ω) = ls implies the existence of a learning tree l, in
which the learning history   ω is followed by the subtree ls. The function is
consistent in the following sense: for any continuation   ω′ of a learning history
  ω, the learning subtree   l(  ω′) is determined as the appropriate subtree of   l(  ω).
This latter requirement implies that a learning process cannot demand that
the ﬁrst two agents should investigate h1 and h2, while at the same time
requiring that agent 2 should investigate h3 after agent 1 observed that h1
was of value.
The diﬀerence between learning trees and processes lies in the fact that
learning processes prescribe learning decisions for every possible learning his-
tory, whereas a learning tree only prescribes learning decisions for the learning
histories that are reachable via the tree. As an example, consider a learning
19In Section 4, I restricted attention to learning histories in which agents move in order
of their index. For this reason, I only consider such learning histories in the proof.
37process   l that prescribes h1 to be the ﬁrst house to be investigated. Accord-
ing to this learning process, only two learning histories of length 1 might
occur; the ﬁrst agent might ﬁnd the house of high or low value. Still   l also
prescribes how learning is continued after the learning history, according to
which the ﬁrst agent found h3 to be of high value. A learning process   l is
said to result in a learning tree l if this learning tree arises when all agents
follow the learning process, formally,   l(∅) = l. Finally,   F : Ω → M denotes
an allocation function which is deﬁned on the entire set of a posteriori pref-
erence proﬁles Ω. The welfare   W of a learning processes   l and allocation
functions   F is deﬁned as follows:
  W(  l,   F): = W(  l(∅),   F|e l(∅)(Ω)).
The strategy to prove that (l∗,F ∗) maximizes W(l,F) is to construct a
learning process and an allocation function (  l∗,   F ∗) that satisfy the following
two properties:
(A)   l
∗(∅) = l
∗ as well as   F
∗|l∗(∅)(Ω) = F
∗
(B)   W(  l
∗,   F
∗) ≥   W(  l,   F) for all (  l,   F)
The two claims together imply W(l∗,F ∗) ≥ W(l,F) for all (l,F), as one
can ﬁnd a (  l,   F) for any (l,F), such that   l(∅) = l as well as   F|l(∅)(Ω) = F.
The upshot of proving this more far reaching hypothesis is that backward
induction can be used to show the optimality of (  l∗,   F ∗). But to start, (  l∗,   F ∗)
ﬁrst needs to be deﬁned.
The learning process   l∗ is deﬁned such that the ﬁrst house to be inves-
tigated according to learning subtree   l∗(  ω) has the minimal index among
the houses that have not yet been found to be of high value. The allo-
cation function   F ∗ : Ω → M is deﬁned as follows: for every house hi,
let Ni(ω) be the set of all j that investigated hi and found it to be of
value Ai; formally, Ni := {j : ω
j
i = Ai}. For all i with Ni(ω)  = ∅, let
  F ∗(ω)(hi) = min{j ∈ Ni(ω)}. Note that these are feasible assignments,
since the condition that each agent can investigate at most one house implies
that the sets Ni(ω) ∩ Ni′(ω) for i  = i′. Now take the agent with the lowest
index who has not yet received a house in the ﬁrst step and assign him any
38house he did not investigate. Repeat this step with the reminder until no
houses and agents remain. Observe that such an assignment is always pos-
sible, since, on the one hand, no agent can investigate more than one house
and, on the other hand, the agent n cannot investigate any house.
The deﬁnitions of l∗, F ∗,   l∗, and   F ∗ directly imply Claim (A). The proof
of Claim (B) needs some work.
To see the optimality of   F ∗, observe that for any a posteriori preference
proﬁle ω and allocation µ the welfare
 
i=1,...,nω
µ(i)
i can not be higher than
 
i=1,...,nmaxj=1,...,nω
j
i, the sum of values of houses in which each house enters
at the maximal value it has for some agent according to ω. According to   F ∗,
each house does enter this sum at its maximal value: a house hi with ω
j
i = Ai
for some j enters the sum at the highest possible value it can achieve (Ai).
For all other houses, it holds that maxj=1,...,nω
j
i = αi. The allocation function
  F ∗ assigns each of these houses to an agent who does not know its value.
To prove the claim that (  l∗,   F ∗) maximizes the expected welfare for every
learning history, yet more notation is needed. The expected welfare of all
agents following the initial history   ω ∈   Ω and then   l, where allocations are
determined using   F ∗, is deﬁned as W(  ω,  l,   F ∗). Note that in this deﬁnition
we do not consider diﬀerent allocation functions, since we already established
above that there is no other allocation function that improves upon   F ∗.
Always denote the house with the lowest index that has not yet been found
to be of high value at   ω as hi∗. The sets of agents and houses still awaiting
an assignment at the learning history λ, given that the allocation function
is   F ∗ are denoted by N(  ω) and H(  ω), respectively. So, hi / ∈ H(  ω) if one
component of   ω is Ai. Let WN(e ω)(  ω,  l,F ∗) be the expected welfare for the
agents in N(  ω) given the learning history   ω the learning process   l and the
allocation function   F ∗. So we have that
W(  ω,  l,   F
∗) =


 
i:hi/ ∈H(e ω)
Ai

 + WN(e ω)(  ω,  l,   F
∗)
We use induction over the number of remaining learners to show that
W(  ω,  l
∗,   F
∗) ≥ W(  ω,  l,   F
∗)
39holds for all learning processes   l and all learning histories   ω. The inductive
proof only considers learning processes   l that prescribe to learn houses in
H(  ω) at   ω, since learning a house not in H(  ω) does not increase expected
welfare (such a house already enters the welfare sum at its highest possible
value).
Start of Induction:
Let there be one learner remaining; i.e., let the length of   ω be n−2. The
welfare of a learning process   l that prescribes learning hi′ ∈ H(ω) at ω can
be calculated as:
W(  ω,  l,   F
∗) =


 
i:hi/ ∈H(e ω)
Ai

 + WN(e ω)(  ω,  l,   F
∗)
=


 
i:hi/ ∈H(e ω)
Ai

 +
 
i∈H(e ω),i =i′
αi + pi′Ai′ + (1 − pi′)αi′
=


 
i:hi/ ∈H(e ω)
Ai

 +
 
i∈H(e ω)
αi + pi′(Ai′ − αi′)
≤


 
i:hi/ ∈H(e ω)
Ai

 +
 
i∈H(e ω)
αi + pi∗(Ai∗ − αi∗) = W(  ω,  l
∗,   F
∗)
since hi∗ is the house with maximal option value in H(  ω).
Induction Step
Assume that the hypothesis holds for all learning histories of length ≥ k.
Take a learning history   ω of length k−1 and assume that the welfare-optimal
learning process   l′ diﬀers from   l∗. Since we know already from the induction
hypothesis that   l∗ is optimal for learning histories that have at least length
k, it must be that   l′ diﬀers from   l∗ in the house that is investigated directly
after   ω, i.e., in stage k. Assume that   l′ prescribes that hi′  = hi∗ is being
40learned after ω. An upper bound on WN(e ω)(  ω,  l′,   F ∗) is calculated as follows:
WN(e ω)(  ω,  l
′,   F
∗)
=pi′Ai′ + pi′WN((e ω,Ai′))((  ω,Ai′),  l
∗,   F
∗) + (1 − pi′)WN((e ω,ai′))((  ω,ai′),  l
∗,   F
∗)
=pi′Ai′ + pi′(pi∗Ai∗ + pi∗WN((e ω,Ai′,Ai∗))((  ω,Ai′,Ai∗),  l
∗,   F
∗)
+ (1 − pi∗)WN((e ω,Ai′,ai∗))((  ω,Ai′,ai∗),  l
∗,   F
∗))
+ (1 − pi′)(pi∗Ai∗ + pi∗WN((e ω,ai′,Ai∗))((  ω,ai′,Ai∗),  l
∗,   F
∗)
+ (1 − pi∗)WN((e ω,ai′,ai∗))((  ω,ai′,ai∗),  l
∗,   F
∗))
=pi∗Ai∗ + pi∗(pi′Ai′ + pi′WN((e ω,Ai∗,Ai′))((  ω,Ai∗,Ai′),  l
∗,   F
∗)
+ (1 − pi′)WN((e ω,Ai∗,ai′))((  ω,Ai∗,ai′),  l
∗,   F
∗))
+ (1 − pi∗)(pi′Ai′ + pi′WN((e ω,ai∗,Ai′))((  ω,ai∗,Ai′),  l
∗,   F
∗)
+ (1 − pi′)WN((e ω,ai∗,ai′))((  ω,ai∗,ai′),  l
∗,   F
∗))
≤pi∗Ai∗ + pi∗WN((λ,Ai∗))((λ,Ai∗),  l
∗,   F
∗)
+ (1 − pi∗)WN((λ,ai∗))((λ,ai∗),  l
∗,   F
∗) = WN(λ)(λ,  l
∗,   F
∗)
The ﬁrst equality follows from the learning process   l′ mandating that hi′
be learned after   ω and the observation that for any learning history of length
k, which includes (  ω,Ai′) as well as (  ω,ai′), we have by induction hypothesis
that   l∗ is the optimal learning process. The second equality follows from   l∗
mandating that hi∗ is being learned next, since it is the house with lowest
index in H((  ω,Ai′)) as well as in H((  ω,ai′)). The third equality is owed to a
rearrangement of terms together with the observation that an exchange of the
order in which houses hi′ and hi∗ are being learned in the preceding history
does not change the expected welfare in any of the four relevant cases. The
inequality follows from the assumption that the hypothesis of the induction
holds for learning histories of length k. Finally, the last equality follows from
the deﬁnition of i∗ and   l∗.
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WN(e ω)(  l
∗(  ω),F
∗) =


 
i:hi/ ∈H(e ω)
Ai

 + WN(e ω)(  ω,  l
∗,   F
∗)
≥


 
i:hi/ ∈H(e ω)
Ai

 + WN(e ω)(  ω,  l,   F
∗)
= WN(e ω)(  l(  ω),F
∗)
holds for learning histories of length k − 1, which concludes the inductive
proof of the optimality of the learning process and allocation function   l∗,   F ∗.
Remarks on Uniqueness
Any allocation function such that ω
µ(i)
i = maxj=1,   ,nω
j
i is optimal. The
optimal learning process   l∗ is unique up to the indexation of houses according
to their option value. Said diﬀerently: there are as many optimal learning
processes as there are indexations of H that have the feature of i ≤ i′ im-
plying that Oi ≤ Oi′. Since the indexation in the proof was arbitrary, we
know already that all of the resulting learning processes are welfare-optimal.
Observe that the crucial inequalities in the start of the induction as well
as the inductive step are strict if there is exactly one house in H(  ω) with
maximal option value. At the start of the induction, we then have that
pi∗(Ai∗ −αi∗) > pi′(Ai′ −αi′) for all i′  = i∗ with hi′ ∈ H(  ω). Similarly, at the
step of the induction we have
pi′Ai′ + pi′WN((e ω,ai∗,Ai′))((  ω,ai∗,Ai′),  l
∗,   F
∗)
+(1 − pi′)WN((e ω,ai∗,ai′))((  ω,ai∗,ai′),  l
∗,   F
∗) < WN((e ω,ai∗))((  ω,ai∗),  l
∗,   F
∗)
for all i′  = i∗ with hi′ ∈ H(  ω). So we can conclude that any learning process
that prescribes for houses to be learned in an order that is not consistent
with their option value order is suboptimal. This implies, in particular, that
there is a unique optimal learning process, and thereby an optimal learning
tree if all houses have diﬀerent option values.
4210.2 The Problem with n learners
Observe that the above proof makes use of the assumption that only n − 1
agents can investigate houses in the deﬁnition of   F ∗, the optimal allocation
function. That function assigns every house that was found to be of high
value to some agent who did ﬁnd it of high value; and no house that was
found to be of low value to an agent who did ﬁnd this house of low value. If n
agents can investigate houses, such allocations might not be feasible. To see
this, consider a housing problem with three houses and assume that the ﬁrst
two agents did ﬁnd houses h1 and h2 of high value and agent 3 found h3 to
be of low value. Clearly, assigning every house that was found to be of high
value to agents who did ﬁnd these houses of high value (houses h1 to agent
1 and h2 to agent 2) conﬂicts with avoiding to assign any house at low value
(not assigning h3 to agent 3). For such cases, the welfare-maximal allocation
depends on the speciﬁc parameters Ai and ai. To show that this observation
not only impacts the calculation of the ﬁrst-best allocation function, but also
the ﬁrst-best learning tree, I provide the following example.
Example 4 Let there be three houses (p1,A1,a1) = (1
2,400,0) and (p2,A2,a2) =
(
1
4,399,−129), (p3,A3,a3) = (
1
1000,98000,0). Observe that O1 = 100, O2 =
99, O3 ≈ 98, α1 = 3, α2 = 77
4 , and α3 = 98
I use backwards induction to show that the ﬁrst-best learning tree for the
present example diﬀers from the ﬁrst-best learning tree l∗ as it was described
in Lemma 1. Let (  l?,   F ?) be the ﬁrst-best learning process and allocation
function in the given problem. To calculate   F ?, observe that as long as it
feasible to follow the prescription of   F ∗, as deﬁned in the proof above, it is
optimal to do so. If, however, the ﬁrst two agents found h1 to be of low value,
and agent 3 found h3 to be of high value,   F ∗ does not determine the welfare-
maximal allocation. In this case, we have the choice between allocating all
houses at their expected values, yielding an expected welfare of 3+ 77
4 +98, or
allocating h1 to one of the agents who do not like it and h3 to agent 3, yielding
0 + 77
4 + 98000, which is higher. I show next that for the learning history
  ω = (a1,a1), the ﬁrst-best (  l?,   F ?) prescribe that agent 3 should investigate h3
and that h3 should be assigned to 3 if he ﬁnds it of high value. The expected
welfare diﬀerence between this prescription and the prescription of assigning
43all houses at their expected value is p3(A3 + a1 − α3 − α1) > 0. Conversely,
the expected welfare diﬀerence between a prescription, according to which
houses h3 and h2 exchange roles, and assigning all houses at expected value
is p2(A2 + a1 − α2 − α1). The diﬀerence between these two expressions is
positive, so learning h3 implies a larger gain in expected welfare, and we have
that   l?(  ω) prescribes for agent 3 to investigate h3. So, which house should
be investigated at   ω′ = (a1)? The diﬀerence between the welfare associated
with the second agent learning h1 or h2 can be calculated as follows.
p1(A1 − α1) + p1p2(A2 − α2) + (1 − p1)p3(A3 + a1 − α1 − α3)−
p2(A2 − α2) + p2p3(A3 + a1 − α1 − α3) + (1 − p2)p1(A1 − α1) =
p2p1(A1 − α1) − (1 − p1)p2(A2 − α2) + (1 − p1 − p2)p3(A3 + a1 − α1 − α3) =
1
4
100 −
1
2
99 +
1
4
1
1000
(98000 + 0 − 200 − 98) = −
298
4000
< 0
Therefore   l?(  ω′) does not prescribe for agent 2 to investigate h1. This
yields the conclusion that the ﬁrst-best learning tree for the given example
is not l∗. To see this, observe that the ﬁrst-best learning tree is   l?(∅). If   l?(∅)
prescribes for agent 1 to initiate learning with an investigation of h1, then
  l?(∅) does not prescribe for agent 2 to investigate h1 again if agent 1 found
it to be of high value, which is a diﬀerence from l∗, which would prescribe
exactly that. If, on the other hand,   l?(∅) prescribes for agent 1 to initiate
learning with an investigation of a diﬀerent house, we also established that
  l?(∅)  = l∗, as the latter requires for agent 1 to investigate h1.
The reason why the characterization of the ﬁrst-best learning tree and
allocation function given in Lemma 1 fails in the case with n learners is that
the deﬁnition of the option value no longer applies to this case. The option
value was deﬁned to capture the expected welfare increase from learning a
house. In the case with n − 1 learners, the option value of house hi turned
out to be pi(Ai − αi), reﬂecting the fact that with probability pi the house
would be found of high value and in this case the mechanism designer would
be able to allocate this house at a utility value of Ai − αi above the case
when no one would ﬁnd this house to be of high value.
To see that this reasoning does not apply to the case with n learners,
consider the learning decision for the second agent after the ﬁrst found h1 to
44be of low value. The relevant option value of learning h1 is not p1(A1 − α1),
as in the case of some agent ﬁnding h1 to be of low value, the house h1 might
end up being assigned to an agent who evaluates it at low value. This will
happen if the third agent ﬁnds h3 of high value. Therefore, in the case with
n learners, option values cannot be determined independently of the housing
problems that they belong to.
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